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Geiger, Mark W. Financial Fraud and Guerrilla Violence in Missouri’s Civil
War, 1861-1865.. Yale University Press, $55.00 ISBN 978-0-3001-5151-0
Looking at Warfare through New Lenses
Interpreting the accretion of private and public violence in the midst of the
American Civil War has long vexed historians, nearly as much as the civilians
and soldiers who lived through it. For those who seek to explain the proliferation
of internecine warfare in the border region during American Civil War, guerrillas
have served as their primary vehicle. Yet the history of guerrilla warfare often
reads as unconnected narratives of countless, seemingly random incidents of
violence whose explanations have most often aligned along the limiting principle
of individualism: in other words, wartime chaos.
This “inside war," as historian Michael Fellman has referred to Missouri’s
guerrilla war, defies reductionism. Like the border states in which this war
largely raged, guerrillas hailed from every social class and found common cause
against a degrading military occupation and their resistance arose from a murky
spectrum of backgrounds and behaviors. Neither muster rolls nor pension files
exist to confirm their existence, much less their motivations. Various
interpretations of irregular warriors who fought in this chaotic war have offered
them variously as vigilantes and societal nihilists—the latter more benignly as
sociopathic drifters and thieves and more dangerously as psychopathic ambush
raiders, arsonists, and murderers. A more recent line of argument about guerrillas
questions both of these characterizations because they fail to categorize the often
amorphous types of combatants who engaged in irregular warfare: partisan
rangers, raiders, bushwhackers, jayhawkers, and gangs of criminals (or
“brigands," as the federal military leadership termed them), among their other,
earthier designations as cut-throats, thieves, bandits, murderers, outlaws, and
devils. What evidence exists was itself deeply politicized during and after the
war according to the shifting loyalties of their recorders.
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Mark W. Geiger’s premise, adapted from his Nevins Economic History
Prize-winning dissertation, is as historically provocative as it is bold. (Far more
so than his book’s pedantic title, unfortunately.) At the war’s outset, in
Missouri’s Boonslick, the slave-rich western river counties, pro-Confederate
Missourians, hailing disproportionately from the upper strata of rural society and
who had for years been engaging in for-profit commercial, slave-based
agriculture and invested heavily in railroad construction during the 1850s in
order to gain greater access to national markets, indebted themselves to local
bankers. With the complicity of the state’s largely proslavery bankers and
governor, Claiborne F. Jackson, himself the former state bank commissioner,
these slaveholders engaged in financial fraud by which they signed promissory
notes to finance the arming of the pro-Confederate Missouri State Guard to
accomplish the secession that their state’s unionist leadership would not. When
federal and state authorities took over the banks in late 1861, many conspirators
saw their farms and slaves auctioned, denying sons in these dispossessed
families their economic and cultural inheritances. Many responded by enlisting
in the Confederate service, but many more reacted by becoming guerrillas to
wage a shadow war upon the governments who had robbed them.
Meticulous original research in archives, courthouses, and legal records and
sophisticated quantified data derived from it, which only a former banker and
trained economist and historian could manage (Geiger is all of these), allows this
book to offer a convincing argument and breathtakingly concise—often too
much so—sweep of a neutral slave state’s bitter harvest of civil war. Historians
will marvel at Geiger’s facile explanations of complex nineteenth-century
banking procedures and laws and his persuasive extrapolation of the layered
meanings behind the financial fraud by which these disloyal Missourians tried to
take the state from the union, paid the price of failure, and constructed a bitter
legacy of defeat.
The book is not without flaws. Less successful, but no less compellingly
researched and argued, is Geiger’s chapter connecting this hidden history to
Missouri’s ensuing guerrilla insurgency. “Geographic overlap, family, and
timing," he writes, “all suggest a link between indebtedness and guerrilla
violence" (108). Although he has convincingly connected an impressive
sampling of identifiable guerrillas who, evidenced by promissory notes and court
cases, were involved in the bank conspiracy, Geiger’s comparison of indebted
counties with guerrilla activity is more intriguing than persuasive. He offers not
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one scrap of supportive qualitative evidence that more than suggests his
argument, nor does he handle the nagging question of latter-day guerrillas who
rode into the brush in parts of the state—especially after emancipation, which
forms virtually no part of Geiger’s story—other than in his sampling counties.
(Jesse James comes first to mind.) In his final chapters, which offer terse yet
capable analyses of wartime politics, postwar identity formation, and an oddly
framed war and administrative state construction, Geiger fails to integrate his
financial story into an argument at all, financial or otherwise, and often loses
sight of the chronological structure he sets forth as essential to his story at the
book’s outset.
Such criticisms should not detract from what is an impressively inventive
and provocative first book that will certainly spark debate about the famed inside
war, whether in Missouri or elsewhere.
Christopher Phillips is Professor of History at the University of Cincinnati
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Identity in the Border West and, most recently, The Making of a Southerner:
William Barclay Napton’s Private Civil War.
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